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Abstract 
Objectification, which refers to the treatment of others as object-like things, has long 
been observed in capitalism. Whilst the negative impact of money on interpersonal harmony 
has been well documented, the social cognitive processes that underlie them are relatively 
unknown. Across four studies, we explored whether the love of money leads to 
objectification, while controlling for social power and status. In Study 1, the love and 
importance attached to money positively predicted the tendency to construe social 
relationships based on instrumentality. In Study 2, the likelihood to favor a target of 
instrumental use was increased by momentarily activating an affective state of being rich. 
Temporarily heightening the motivation for money further resulted in deprivation of mental 
capacities of irrelevant others, including humans (Study 3) and animals (Study 4). This lack of 
perceived mental states partially mediated the effects of money on subsequent immoral 
behavior (Study 4). The findings are the first to reveal the role of objectification as a potential 
social cognitive mechanism for explaining why money often harms interpersonal harmony. 
 
 
Keywords: money, market-pricing mode, objectification, instrumentality, mental state, 
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 The Love of Money Results in Objectification 
As one of the greatest inventions, money has brought profound changes and 
convenience to economic trade. However, when it comes to interpersonal relationships, 
money has been found to have a dark underbelly by increasing selfishness and ‘breeding’ 
unethical behavior (e.g. Gino & Pierce, 2009; Tang & Chen, 2008; Tang, Chen, & Sutarso, 
2008). Specifically, money reduces pro-sociality (Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009), compassion in the 
face of others’ misfortunes (Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012), and the ability for emotional 
inference and perspective taking (Caruso, Mead, & Vohs, 2009; Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 
2013). These effects are robust as even using subtle reminders of money (e.g., exposure to 
money-related words and images) can lead to negative consequences such as cheating 
(Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013) and a reduction in helpful behavior (Vohs, 
Mead, & Goode, 2006; for a review see Vohs, 2015). Despite consistent findings about the 
detrimental effects of money, little is known about the underlying social cognitive processes 
that justify such conduct. In this article, we explore a novel mechanism for explaining the 
unethical and undesirable interpersonal outcomes brought about by money: objectification. 
Definition of Objectification 
The tendency to view and treat others as objects can be considered as one of the most 
deleterious forms of prejudice (Nussbaum, 1999). Among the many facets of objectification, 
two have been proposed as central to its definition: 1) treating a target as a means to one’s 
ends (i.e. instrumentality) and 2) depriving the target of its essential humanity such as mental 
state capacities (i.e. agency, autonomy, and subjectivity, Nussbaum, 1995; Papadaki, 2007; 
Loughnan et al., 2010). Within social relationships, people typically value and are likely to 
approach targets who display traits that facilitate interaction and bonding, such as similarity, 
interpersonal warmth, and kindness (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). When a target is objectified, 
these personal attributes migrate to the background in favor of the target’s usefulness. During 
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this process, the person is figuratively split into parts, with only those traits being seen as 
valuable that can serve a perceiver’s current goal (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 
2008). In a similar way to that in which the process applies to objects, the person then 
becomes a means to one’s ends and is reduced to the status of a tool for goal achievement. 
Besides the instrumentality assumption, objectification also refers to the denial of 
agency, autonomy, and subjectivity (Nussbaum, 1995). One of the fundamental conditions to 
be seen as fully human lies in the capacity for having complex mental states (Papadaki, 2007; 
Loughnan et al., 2010). These typically include cognitive abilities (e.g. agency, autonomy) as 
well as fundamental experiences and feelings (e.g., joy, pain; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). 
Due to their biological nature, living entities such as human and animals, are by default 
perceived as possessing mental states, although the level of such capacities may vary (e.g. 
Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Penn & Povinelli, 2007). When objectification 
occurs, however, targets are seen as lacking respective capacities, hence being likened to 
mindless objects.  
Such withdrawal of others’ mental states could further facilitate a third aspect of 
objectification, namely violability (i.e., lack in boundary integrity, Nussbaum, 1995). Mental 
state attributions have been highlighted as an essential ingredient for considering a target as 
worthy of moral concern (Gray et al., 2012). If a target is deprived of its mental abilities that 
make it a part of the moral community, immoral actions towards objectified targets become 
permissible. In line with this argument, violability in the form of immoral actions displayed 
towards sexualized human targets or food animals was found to be the result of lower state 
mind-attributions (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010).  
Whereas it has been well-documented that women are often sexually objectified (e.g. 
Gervais, Vescio, Förster, Maass & Suitner, 2012; Loughnan, et al. 2010; Vaes, Paladino, & 
Puvia, 2011), object-like treatment of all humans occurs in a number of domains (for a 
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review, see Haslam, 2006). Of interest for the present research endeavor, economists and 
sociologists have long posited the existence of objectification in the economic system (e.g. 
Blauner, 1964). For instance, under capitalism where the most prominent aim is to increase 
wealth, workers have been considered to be mere instruments that can be reduced to their 
work productivity (Marx, 1844). Recent empirical studies point toward the link between 
objectification and power (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013; Inesi, Lee, & 
Rios, 2014). Besides the fact that employees commonly act in the role of power receivers, 
objectification rises with specific features of factory work and a focus on the instrumentality 
of work-related attributes (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, & Volpato, 2016; Baldissarri, 
Andrighetto, & Volpato, 2014). Such economic valuation of human targets in labor markets 
can further reduce activity in brain networks related to social cognition (e.g. medial prefrontal 
cortex; Harris, Lee, Capestany, & Cohen, 2014).  
The findings provide significant insights into objectification within the economic 
domain. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to differentiate between multiple concepts (i.e. 
economic interests, social power, status) that may be intertwined in driving respective 
processes. The present work addresses this issue by investigating whether the sole desire for 
money, one of the most prevalent phenomenon in capitalism as well as in everyday life, leads 
to objectification.   
Money and Objectification  
Given that money functions as a tool for economic exchange, there exists a strong 
association between money and its utility (Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman, & Ariely, 2015). 
Correspondingly, monetary thoughts activate a mindset of market-pricing in which social 
relations are seen in transactional terms with inputs (costs) and expected outputs (benefits) 
(Fiske, 1992). Such costs and benefits can be defined in monetary terms (e.g. price, 
commission, and wage), but can also take more abstract forms (e.g. mental effort, time, and 
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care). In this vein, Heyman and Ariely (2004) showed that the effort exerted in helping others 
was directly proportional to the magnitude of anticipated reward once this economic mindset 
was activated. 
Importantly, self-gain acts as the fundamental motive in economic reasoning, which in 
turn translates to a focus on goal achievement (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). To maximize 
personal benefits, one needs to effectively calculate how others could facilitate its fulfillment. 
For this, a utilitarian view is adopted in which social targets are considered to be relevant if 
their attributes are congruent with one’s current goal. Similar to what happened under 
objectification, the usefulness of the target then becomes a defining feature that determines 
the construal of the relationship. Monetary thoughts could therefore lead to objectification by 
encouraging people to focus on a target’s instrumental use for goal attainment. 
In parallel, money might foster a mindset that increases disregard of those who do not 
facilitate self-gain and achieving a goal. Indeed, money has been shown to increase one’s 
distance from others, both physically and mentally (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2013; Vohs, 
Mead, & Goode, 2008), and impede perspective-taking and compassion (e.g. Caruso et al., 
2009; Molinsky et al., 2012). To minimize costs and input, money could therefore undermine 
motives to perceive a mind in irrelevant targets. This may result in the denial of subjectivity 
so as to conserve mental energy for attending to more useful information. Given that mind 
attribution is an essential ingredient for moral concern (Gray et al., 2012), lower subjectivity 
as a result of monetary thoughts could further pave the way for violable, unethical behavior. 
Aims of Present Research 
A predominant goal in capitalism is to increase wealth (Marx, 1844) which is well 
reflected in the value ascribed to money. The current research aimed to examine whether the 
desire for money (i.e. love of money) leads to objectification. Love of money reflects the 
combined notions of the importance attached to money (cognition), the desire to be rich 
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(affect), and the motivation to pursue money (Tang & Chiu, 2003; Tang & Chen, 2008). In 
line with previous works, we focused on the affective and motivational aspects in the love of 
money (for an overview see Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). To assess this construct, we 
measured people’s attitudes toward money with a combined money scale in Study 1, and 
subsequently manipulated love of money by eliciting an affective state of being rich (Study 2) 
or activating the motivation to increase money (Studies 3 and 4).  
By definition, love of money is not equal to one’s objective need for money (Tang & 
Chiu, 2003), which is often determined by a person’s financial resources or wealth. While 
previous studies consistently revealed a negative impact of money on ethicality and 
interpersonal harmony, inconsistencies still exist with respect to whether money independent 
of socioeconomic status leads to immorality and mental state deprivation (Hall, Mast, & Latu, 
2015; Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012; 
Tang & Chiu, 2003). Only one past study has examined the direct link between love of money 
and unethicality via a calculation-based mindset, i.e. Machiavellianism (Tang & Chen, 2008). 
The trait measure of Machiavellianism, however, relates more to a personality syndrome of 
employing manipulative and devious methods for personal goal achievement (Wilson, Near, 
& Miller, 1996).  
To fill this empirical gap in the literature, the present research aims to provide the first 
evidence for the relationship between love of money and objectification by controlling for 
socioeconomic status. It does so by considering multiple dimensions of objectification, 
namely instrumentality, denial of mental states, as well as violability. Furthermore, it 
highlights the role of mental state attribution in explaining subsequent immoral and violent 
behaviors caused by money.  
To that end, we first aim to investigate the link between love of money and the 
instrumentality dimension of objectification. We predict that the love and importance attached 
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to money enhance the tendency to view relationships with others as instrumental (Study 1). 
Furthermore, the affective state of being rich, by thinking about a lifestyle of sheer 
abundance, should make people more likely to choose targets based on their instrumental use 
to achieve a goal (Study 2). Secondly, we aim to explore whether the love of money leads to 
the denial of mental states in irrelevant targets, which in turn may function to justify further 
immoral behaviors. For this, we predict that the motivation for money, by thinking about 
ways to increase seed money, would make participants more likely to deprive others of their 
mental capacities. Based on evidence showing that people apply a unifying cognitive template 
for mind perception and morality concerns across species (see Gray et al., 2012), this effect 
should generalize to human targets (Study 3) and animals (Study 4). Lastly, we examined 
whether mental state attribution ultimately mediates the effect of money on unethical behavior 
(Study 4).  
 
Study 1: Self-Report of Objectification 
Study 1 was designed to test whether there exists a link between love of money and 
instrumentality as a form of objectification. To this end, the full money scale by Lim and Teo 
(1997) together with a subscale of the YTF Money Scale (Baker & Hagedorn, 2008) were 
employed to measure people’s attitudes toward money. In addition, we used the 
objectification scale by Gruenfeld et al. (2008) which measures the extent to which 
relationships are viewed as instrumental. To rule out the potential influence of extraneous 
variables, we included measures of social power and socioeconomic status.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred and eighteen (105 women, Mage = 24.2, SD = 9.55) 
participants (55 % Caucasian, 33% Asian, and 12% others) were recruited through the 
undergraduate psychology subject pool (N = 58) and via a psychological research website (N 
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= 60). Participants took part in this study in exchange for course credits or on a voluntary 
basis. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their participation. 
Design and Procedure. The study was conducted online using Qualtrics survey 
software. After reading the instructions and providing some general demographic information, 
participants first completed the 10-item Objectification Scale (Gruenfeld et. al., 2008) that 
was modified to assess the extent to which people perceive general others (rather than one 
specific person) as instrumental and their relationships as contingent on goal state. Example 
items were “I always approach those people who are very useful to me” and “If something 
changes and a person won’t be helpful to me anymore, my relationship with this person won’t 
continue”. All items were rated on 7-point Likert scales where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = 
strongly agree. A scale score was calculated by averaging all items, with higher scores 
indicating higher degrees of objectification (α = .63). 
Participants then completed the 34-item Money Scale (Lim & Teo, 1997) which 
measures various aspects of money attitudes in the form of eight subscales: obsession, power, 
budget, achievement, evaluation, anxiety, retention, and non-generosity. Example items were 
“Money is the most important goal in my life” (obsession) and “Money gives you autonomy 
or freedom” (power). To assess the degree to which money is used for signaling one’s power, 
importance and achievement, we further included the 11-item power-prestige subscale from 
the YTF Money Scale (i.e. a combined scale of Yamauchi and Templer’s MAS Scale and 
Furnham’s MBBS scale, Baker & Hagedorn, 2008). Example items were “I use money to 
influence people to do things for me” and “I am proud of my financial victories – pay, riches, 
investments, etc. – and let my friends know about them.” All items were rated on 7-point 
Likert scales where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. A total score was computed 
as the mean of all 45 items, with higher scores reflecting greater importance attached to 
money (α = .90).  
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Next, socioeconomic status was assessed through three items: (a) the social status 
ladder (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) ranging from 1= the lowest standing to 10 
= the highest standing, (b) educational level (twelve options from 1= no schooling completed 
to 12 = doctorate degree), and (c) total household income (fourteen options from 1= less than 
£6000/ $10,000 to 14 = £150,000/$250,000 or more). 
Lastly, participants completed the 8-item Sense of Power Scale (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006) which measures an individual’s general sense of power and influence over 
others in relationships (e.g., “If I want to, I get to make the decisions”). Items were endorsed 
on 7-point Likert scales, from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. A scale score was 
computed as the average of all items, with higher scores indicating stronger perceptions of 
personal power (α = .81). For all measures, items within each scale were presented in a 
random order.  
Results and Discussion 
Correlational analyses showed that the tendency to objectify others in relationships 
significantly increased with the subjective importance attached to money, r (118) = .37, p < 
.001. When the money subscales were examined separately, five aspects of money attitudes 
significantly correlated with the degree of objectification: obsession (α = .76), r (118) = .47, p 
< .001; power (α = .68), r (118) = .31, p = .001; achievement (α = .74), r (118) = .26, p = 
.004; anxiety (α = .67), r (118) = .26, p = .004; and power-prestige (α = .82), r (118) = .49, p 
< .001 (see Table 1). In a multiple regression, money obsession, β = .28, t (113) = 2.44, p = 
.016, and money power-prestige, β = .28, t (113) = 2.39, p = .018, F (2, 113) = 21.1, R2 = .26, 
p < .001, emerged as the sole predictors of objectification among all measures, including 
general sense of power and socioeconomic status (i.e. social status, educational level, and 
income). Thus, respondents’ inclination to objectify others by viewing their relationships as 
11 
 
instrumental could be significantly predicted by their propensity to obsess about money and 
believe in money prestige. 
 
Study 2: Choice of Work Partner 
The first study provided preliminary evidence for the association between money 
attitudes and objectification. Specifically, money obsession and money power-prestige, both 
of which signify the love and importance attached to money (Tang & Chiu, 2003) acted as 
significant predictors of the instrumentality dimension of objectification. This was shown 
when controlling for the potential impact of socioeconomic status and sense of power. In a 
second study, we aimed to corroborate and extend the findings by exploring the causal effects 
of love of money on objectification.  
To test whether objectification increases with money as an affective value (i.e. affect 
toward being rich), participants either imagined living a life of sheer affluence (money 
condition) or described their ordinary daily life (control condition). Subsequently, they were 
given a goal to conduct a science project, for which a choice needed to be made between two 
work partners that differed in their usefulness. We predicted that the affective state of being 
rich increases the tendency to favor the target of instrumental use by shifting the focus from 
personal traits to a goal contingent trait. For the purpose of replication, we included measures 
of social power and socioeconomic status again. 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-two participants (41 women, Mage = 31.5, SD = 8.9) (76% 
Caucasian, 6% Hispanic, 4% Black, and 14% others) were recruited from public areas in 
central London (i.e., public libraries and cafeterias) and took part in the study on a voluntary 
basis. Data from eight participants were excluded due to incompleteness or failure to follow 
instructions in the writing task1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions 
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(money vs. control), resulting in forty-one people in the money condition and forty-three in 
the control condition. Informed consent was obtained from all people prior to their 
participation. 
Design and Procedure.  The study was described as a two-part study with unrelated 
segments and was completed on paper. In the first part, participants completed a writing task. 
To elicit the affective state of being rich (money condition), they were asked to imagine 
becoming a big lottery winner and living a life of sheer abundance. As such, they could use 
the money to achieve a life that they have ever dreamed of and do things that they have 
always wanted to (see Vohs et al., 2008 for similar instructions). In the control condition, they 
described their ordinary daily activities and routines. In both conditions, participants had to 
describe a typical day in this life and write at least 250 words about what they would do, 
where they would go, and how they would feel. To measure social power, participants 
reported after the writing task how much control and influence they had experienced over 
other people in the scenario described, using 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 9 (extremely).  
In the second part of the study, a decision task adapted from Gruenfeld et al. (2008) 
was used to assess instrumentality in partner choice. Participants were provided with a written 
scenario in which they were given a goal to accomplish a science project. For this goal, they 
had to choose between two work partners: (a) a useful but callous Partner A - “good at 
science-based subjects but cold and unkind”, or (b) a kind but useless Partner B - “warm and 
kind but not good at science-based subjects”. Preferences in terms of partner choice were 
indicated using a 6-point Likert scale (1 = strongly prefer A, 2 = prefer A, 3 = slightly prefer 
A, 4 = slight prefer B, 5 = prefer B, and 6 = strongly prefer B). The matching between 
alphabets (A or B) and partners (useful or kind) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Responses were coded so that lower scores indicated higher preferences for the useful partner. 
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Lastly, participants answered the same three questions about their socioeconomic status as in 
Study 1. 
Results and Discussion 
In line with predictions, participants in the money condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.38) 
revealed a stronger preference to work with the useful but unkind partner than those in the 
control condition (M = 4.35, SD = 1.48), t (82) = -2.91, p = .005, d = 0.64. Money as a 
desirable good with affective value (i.e., affect toward being rich, Tang & Chiu, 2003) 
consequently led to greater instrumentality in the construal of relationships with others. The 
subjective feeling of influence was higher in the money condition (M = 7.10, SD = 1.50) 
compared to the control condition (M = 6.47, SD = 1.33), t (82) = 2.05, p = .044, d = 0.45. 
However, when controlling for social power (control, influence) and socioeconomic status in 
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), the effect of condition (money vs. control) on 
instrumental partner preference remained significant, F (1, 75) = 11.0, p = .001, ηp2 = .13, 
thereby ruling out alternative explanations. Together, the first two studies showed that love of 
money leads to the treatment of others as a means to one’s end, by construing relationships 
based on people’s instrumentality and goal congruent traits. 
 
Study 3: Mind Perception of Human Faces 
While the focus of the previous two studies was on instrumentality, in subsequent 
experiments (Studies 3 and 4) we planned to study the effect of money on the second essential 
dimension of objectification, namely the deprival of mental states (Nussbaum, 1995; Gray et 
al., 2012). In addition, we aimed to explore the role of money as a motivator (i.e. pursuing 
money). Besides the greater relevance in terms of incentive structures of money experienced 
in everyday life, it allowed us to investigate the motivational mechanisms involved in the love 
of money. To this end, participants were presented with facial images varying in realism 
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which they had to evaluate with respect to their mental state capacities. We hypothesized that 
target faces would need to look more realistic in order to be perceived as human when 
participants had been thinking of ways to increase seed money (money condition) compared 
to daily travel plans (control condition). For the purpose of replication, measures of social 
power and socioeconomic status were included again. 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-two White Caucasian participants (44 women, Mage = 30.9, SD = 
7.37) were recruited from a public library in central London and took part in the study on a 
voluntary basis. Data from seven participants were excluded due to failure to follow 
instructions in the writing task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions 
(money vs. control), resulting in forty-three people in the money condition and forty-two 
people in the control condition. Informed consent was obtained from all people prior to their 
participation. 
Stimuli. Facial stimuli were taken from Krumhuber, Swiderska, Tsankova, Kamble, 
and Kappas (2015) and featured three Caucasian male targets that had been selected from a 
pool of ten male identities. A pilot study (N = 30) showed that there were no significant 
differences between the three male targets in terms of perceived attractiveness (M = 1.84), 
intelligence (M = 2.58), trustworthiness (M = 2.39), and likeability (M = 2.32; 5-point scale, 
all ps > .05). By morphing between human realistic and artificial (i.e., stylized) versions of 
each target face, image sequences were obtained that displayed equal increments of physical 
change between the human and artificial endpoint. For the present study, we selected images 
from seven points spaced across the morph sequence, resulting in nine variants for each facial 
identity (1 human, 7 morphs, and 1 artificial) (see Figure 1A). The resulting 27 facial stimuli 
(3 identities x 9 variants) were displayed in color on white background and measured 400 x 
380 pixels. 
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Design and Procedure. The study was described as a two-part study with ostensibly 
unrelated segments and was conducted using Qualtrics survey software. In the first part, 
participants were given a writing task. To activate the motivation for money (money 
condition), participants came up with three ways to invest £20,000 of seed money. For this, 
they had to outline specific plans about what they would do with the money (i.e. steps of their 
investment plans and expected profits). In the control condition, participants came up with 
three ways to get to the current location (i.e. the public place in central London) from where 
they lived (i.e. their residential location). This involved the description of specific routes they 
would take, the places they would go past and the time each route would take. In both 
conditions, participants were required to write at least 200 words. To measure social power, 
participants reported after the writing task how much control and influence they had 
experienced over other people in the scenario described, using 9-point Likert scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).  
The second part of the study consisted of a face evaluation task in which participants 
had to judge facial stimuli that ranged from human realistic to artificial on mental states 
capacities. Given that the notion of mental state includes both cognitive abilities and 
fundamental human experiences (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), participants evaluated each 
image on two mind attributes, namely the capacity a) to think and plan (i.e. agency), and b) to 
feel pain (i.e. experience, see Nussbaum, 1995; Gray et al., 2012). Stimulus evaluation was 
blocked for each attribute, with all 27 images (i.e. 9 morph level x 3 face exemplars) 
presented in each block. Ratings were made on 7-point Likert scales, with response options 
ranging from 1 (definitely not able to feel pain; definitely does not have a mind) to 7 
(definitely able to feel pain; definitely has a mind). The ordering of the two blocks as well as 
the facial stimuli within each block were randomized. Finally, participants answered the same 
three questions about their socioeconomic status as in Studies 1 and 2. 
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Results and Discussion 
One mental state attribution score was obtained by averaging the ratings of experience 
and agency across the three facial identities for each morph level (Cronbach’s αs > .86). We 
further linearly transformed the original ratings from the 7-point Likert scales into scores 
ranging from 0 to 1 (with higher scores indicating greater mind attribution). A repeated 
measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA) with condition (money, control) as a between-
subjects factor and morph level (1 – 9) as a within-subjects factor was performed on the 
standardized scores of mind attribution. The Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment to the degrees of 
freedom was applied to all univariate analyses. Participants’ gender was excluded from the 
analyses due to lack of any significant effects of this variable in preliminary tests (ps > .37). 
 As predicted, a significant main effect emerged for condition, F (1, 83) = 9.09, p = 
.003, ηp2= .099, showing that money as a motivator generally decreased participants’ tendency 
to attribute mental capacities to the target faces (Mmoney = 0.42 vs. Mcontrol = 0.49).  
The subjective feeling of influence was higher in the money condition (M = 5.81, SD 
= 1.99) compared to the control condition (M = 4.33, SD = 2.71), t (83) = 2.88, p = .005, d = 
0.62). In an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with social power (control, influence) and 
socioeconomic status as covariates, the effect of condition (money vs. control) however 
remained significant for mental state attribution, F (1, 78) = 11.2, p = .001, ηp2 = .13. 
To calculate the threshold in participants‘ attribution of human traits, psychometric 
curves for pain and mind were obtained by fitting the standardized scores with a Gaussian 
distribution in GraphPad Prism 6 (GraphPad Software Inc., California, USA) (see R2 in Figure 
1B for overall fit indexes of the model). The Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) was derived 
from the intersection of the fitted curve with the midpoint of the measure (see horizontal line 
at value 0.5 in Figure 1B). Theoretically, the PSE value should correspond to morph 5 on the 
abscissa where the face is half animate/inanimate (50%). As can be seen in Figure 1B, 
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significant differences in the PSE values occurred between the two groups for mental state 
attribution, U = 562, p = .004 (Mdnmoney = 5.76 vs. Mdncontrol = 5.29)
 2, with participants’ PSE 
being closer to the human endpoint when they had been thinking about money. For 
participants in the money condition the target faces therefore needed to be more realistic in 
order to be perceived as human than for those who were in the control condition. 
 
Study 4: Destructive Behavior towards a Plush Toy 
The previous experiment demonstrated that money as a motivational force led to 
greater denial of mental state capacities in human targets, with more stringent thresholds in 
mind attribution. In the final study, we explored whether this finding extends to non-human 
targets such as animals. Whilst the perception of mental capacities in animals may be 
generally weaker than that in humans (Bastian et al., 2012), the motivational factors in mental 
state attribution may be similar (e.g. Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008), allowing for 
the effects of money to generalize across species.   
In addition, we tested whether love of money affects the violability dimension of 
objectification (Nussbaum, 1995) in terms of increased unethical intentions. For this, a novel 
behavioral task was developed which allowed us to directly assess destructive tendencies 
toward a plush toy. If mind perception acts as the driving force, we expected the effect of 
money in the treatment of the plush toy to be significantly mediated by attributed levels of 
mental states to nonhuman animals. To rule out explanations based on individual differences 
in the value attached to material objects, we included a measure of materialism.   
Method 
Participants. Eighty-seven (Mage = 33.2, SD = 8.62) male participants (74% 
Caucasian, 12% Asian, and 14% Hispanic) were recruited from a public library in central 
London and took part in the study on a voluntary basis. We focused on men as the study 
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sample of interest to control for potential gender differences in destructive inclinations 
(Archer, 2004). Data from five participants were excluded due to failure to follow instructions 
in the writing task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (money vs. 
control), resulting in forty-one people in each condition. Informed consent was obtained from 
all people prior to their participation. 
Stimuli. Seven animals of varying intelligence levels that rarely qualify as pets or 
food products were chosen from previous work on mind perception (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012; 
Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 2007) and included a pigeon, lion, antelope, turtle, squirrel, 
frog, and butterfly. All animals were presented as color images on white background (400 x 
300 pixels) as selected from the Internet. 
Design and Procedure. The study was described as a three-part study with ostensibly 
unrelated segments and was conducted using Qualtrics survey software. Participants first 
completed the same writing task (money condition: strategies to increase seed money of 
£20,000; control condition: daily travel plans) as in Study 3. As a control measure of 
materialism, we then asked participants to answer two questions from the short version of the 
Material Values Scale (Richins, 2004) which assesses the extent to which success is defined 
in terms of material things (“I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes”) 
and material possessions are seen as central to one’s life (“Buying things gives me a lot of 
pleasure”). Items were endorsed on 7-point Likert scales, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = 
strongly agree.  
In the second part of the study, we measured the degree of mental state attribution. In 
particular, participants rated the extent to which each of the seven animals 1) possessed 
cognitive abilities (i.e., self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition, and planning) 
and 2) was capable of fundamental experience (i.e., hunger, fear, pleasure, pain, and rage) 
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using 7-point Likert scales (1 = definitely not, 7 = definitely yes). Stimulus and item order was 
randomized. 
The third part was construed as an independent consumer test that aimed to assess a 
new product available for purchase in the coming months. In order to provide appropriate 
feedback to the manufacturer participants were encouraged to evaluate the quality of a plush 
toy (teddy bear of approx. 12 x 9 cm size, see Figure 2) on several dimensions. Material 
checks were performed at three stages and required participants first to cut off various body 
parts (i.e., arms, legs and ears) with the use of scissors, then cut through the main body, and 
finally remove the eyes by pulling them out. To detract from the main study hypothesis, 
participants rated the material at each stage on elasticity, softness and ease of manipulation, 
respectively, using 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (very inflexible/scratchy/not easy at 
all) to 7 (very flexible/soft/very easy). Lastly, they estimated the price of the product (eight 
options from £0.1 to £3) and feelings of guilt of what they had done on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (not guilty at all) to 7 (very guilty). 
Behavioral Coding. A coding scheme was developed to measure three types of 
destructive behavior on graduated scales: a) number of body parts fully removed (including 
eye/s, nose, ear/s, whole arm/s, whole leg/s, part of arm/leg, and head), b) size of cuts through 
the body/body parts (1 – slightly to 5 – extremely severe), and c) amount of inner material 
removed (1-very little to 3 – a lot). Each behavior was assigned a certain weight in the 
calculation of the product’s damage3. A total damage score was derived from the sum of all 
scores given across the three dimensions, ranging from 0 to 23, with higher scores reflecting 
more destructive behavior. Two raters who were blind to the type of condition (money, 
control) independently followed the coding scheme. Interrater agreement was very high, κ = 
.96 (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007), demonstrating good reliability. 
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Results and Discussion 
Animal Ratings. An overall mental attribution score was obtained by averaging the 
ratings of cognitive abilities and fundamental experience across all seven animals (Cronbach’s 
α = .88). An independent sample t-test showed that participants in the money condition (M = 
4.04, SD = 1.06) were significantly less likely to attribute mental states to these animals than 
those in the control condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.01), t (80) = -2.67, p = .009, d = - 0.60.  
Behavioral Task. Composite damage scores by the two coders were averaged and 
square-root transformed to reduce skewness. As predicted, thinking about money made 
participants behave more destructively by causing greater damage to the plush toy (M = 2.35, 
SD = 0.82) than thinking about daily travel plans (M = 1.53, SD = 1.34), t (80) = 3.37, p = 
.001, d = 0.74 (see Figure 2 for examples). There was no significant difference between the 
two conditions in terms of price estimates for the product, t (80) = - 0.44, p = .66, d = - 0.10, 
and feelings of guilt, t (80) = 0.19, p = .85, d = 0.04. Similarly, perceived elasticity, softness 
and ease of manipulation did not vary with the type of condition, /t/s < 0.99, ps > .32. The 
damage done to the plush toy was therefore unlikely to be due to the way in which the product 
was seen. When controlling for materialism (success, centrality) in an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA), the effect of condition (money, control) on mental state attribution, F (1, 78) = 
6.39, p = .014, ηp2 = .076, as well as on destructive behavior remained significant, F (1, 78) = 
10.4, p = .002, ηp2 = .12, excluding explanations based on dispositional factors. 
Mediation Analysis. In order to examine whether money as a motivational source 
leads to destructive behavior via deprived perception of mental states, we conducted 
mediation analyses. As shown in Figure 3, condition (money, control) predicted mental state 
attribution, as well as destructive behavior. Similarly, mental state attribution predicted 
destructive behavior. When controlling for mental state attribution, the effect of condition 
(money, control) on destructive behavior was reduced. A bootstrapped analysis (Preacher & 
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Hayes, 2008; 5000 re-samples) revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the indirect 
effect did not include zero, [CI = -.39 to -.025]4. This indicates that the unethical behavior 
caused by money was partially mediated by the decreased mental state attribution. In sum, 
Study 4 showed that money led to lower mind attributions of animals, with perceptions of 
mental states accounting for the subsequent unethicality brought about by money.  
 
General Discussion 
Whilst the negative influence of money in interpersonal relationships is well known, 
little attention has been given to the underlying social cognitive mechanisms. Recent 
empirical evidence has pointed toward objectification in the economic domain (e.g. 
Andrighetto et al., 2016; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Harris et al., 2014), however, the specific role 
of money remained unexplored. The present research aimed to fill this empirical gap by 
examining whether objectification results from the love of money, and can account for the 
unethical outcomes brought about by money. Across four studies, we showed that the love 
and importance attached to money correlated positively with the tendency to construe social 
relationships in terms of perceived instrumentality (Study 1). Temporarily eliciting an 
affective state of being rich led participants to prefer targets that were of direct use to their 
goal achievement (Study 2). Thinking about strategies to increase seed money further resulted 
in the deprival of mental capacities (i.e., cognitive abilities and fundamental experience) of 
irrelevant targets, including humans (Study 3) and animals (Study 4). This lack of perceived 
mental states partially mediated the effects of money on subsequent destructive behavior 
(Study 4).   
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to reveal a link between the love of money 
and objectification. These findings have important implications for research in several ways. 
Firstly, they contribute to an emerging line of work on objectification in non-sexual contexts. 
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Up to now, most evidence has been gathered within the sexual realm (see Gervais et al, 2012; 
Loughnan, et al., 2010; Vaes et al., 2011), with only a few studies focusing on objectification 
in money-related domains, such as work settings and labor markets (e.g. Andrighetto et al., 
2016; Harris et al., 2014). While these provide important insights into economic 
objectification under capitalism they do not allow for the role of money to be studied separate 
from other potential confounding variables such as social power and status. Up to now, 
explanations for the detrimental effects of money on interpersonal harmony have mainly 
relied on market-pricing mode (Kouchaki et al., 2013; Fiske, 1992; Vohs et al., 2008) and 
offer accounts that describe a mindset of calculation with a focus on personal gain and goal 
achievement (Fiske, 1992; Vohs et al., 2008). However, they do not directly address the link 
between money and objectification as a social cognitive process. The present research 
combines the two fields by showing that objectification emerges with the sole desire for 
money and can partially explain the unethical outcomes brought about by money. 
By employing a variety of paradigms, we demonstrated the impact of money as a 
motivational and affective source. This also involved the development of a novel behavioral 
task for evaluating actual destructive tendencies towards a plush toy. Besides its role as an 
implicit measure (thereby avoiding desirability effects inherent in self-reports), it can function 
as a state-level indicator of violable behavior. In addition, unethical intentions due to money 
have often been associated with the attainment of economic benefits (i.e., lying or cheating to 
obtain more money, Kouchaki et al., 2013). Given that equivalent effects were found in the 
present research without such monetary reward (Study 4), we consider mental state 
deprivation to be crucial for facilitating moral disengagement (see Bandura, 1999; Gray et al., 
2012). This denial of mental states may be particularly relevant in cases where immoral 
behavior cannot be attributed to an external motivation (e.g. money incentive). 
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Despite the novelty of the present work, it is worth pointing out some limitations and 
directions for future research. While the current findings are in line with predictions by 
market-pricing mode, they may not be explained purely from a functionalist perspective (i.e. 
maximization of gain and minimization of cost). Communal mode mentality, in which 
kindness and altruism are seen as central to social relations, lies at the opposite end of market 
pricing mode (Fiske, 1992; Gasiorowska, Chaplin, Zaleskiewicz, Wygrab, & Vohs, 2016). It 
has been demonstrated that money brings about behavior that is consistent with market-
pricing mode (i.e. self-gain and goal-achievement) while it impairs behavior consistent with 
the communal mode (i.e. pro-sociality and generosity; Gasiorowska et al., 2016). It is 
therefore equally likely that mind deprivation is caused by a reduced motivation for social 
bonding and intimacy (Wheatley, Kang, Parkinson, & Looser, 2012) due to the de-activation 
of the communal mode. Although we do not consider these two processes to be mutually 
exclusive, future studies could examine their relative contributions. This would also allow for 
an analysis of the conditions under which the detrimental effects of money on interpersonal 
relations reverse (e.g. when mind perception proves beneficial for goal attainment; when 
money is deliberately used for altruistic purposes, such as donation). 
In the present research, similar effects of money were found using different dependent 
measures. Nonetheless, it is possible that the love of money primed concepts other than those 
discussed in this paper. For example, there is evidence showing that reminders of money 
make people work harder on competency tasks (e.g. Vohs et al, 2006, 2008; Gasiorowska et 
al., 2016). Such performance motivation could have made participants in Study 2 focus more 
on the partner’s competence which inevitably serves as a confound of usefulness. Higher 
motivation to perform in a task might also explain why mind deprivation in Study 4 only 
partially mediated the effects of money on destructive behavior. Alternatively, the affective 
state of being rich (Study 2) could have primed a high-status position which in turn led 
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participants to prefer a partner with similar high-status traits (i.e. competent but cold). 
Although the effects of money were shown to go beyond participants’ social power and status, 
future studies might include additional measures to control for potential confounds. The two 
dimensions of competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) seem particularly 
relevant in this case. 
In this paper, we have shown that objectification increases with money as an affective 
and motivational source. Specifically, the love of money led to a greater tendency to favor 
targets based on their instrumental use and deprive irrelevant others of their mental states. 
Such diminished mind perception further accounted for the unethicality brought about by 
money. The present work constitutes a first step in showing that objectification (i.e. mental 
state attribution) acts as the social cognitive link between money and immoral behavior. 
Continuing this type of research will allow for clear predictions about how and when money 
leads to detrimental outcomes. 
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Footnotes 
1 Participants who failed to write less than 120 words or come up with at least two 
strategies/plans were excluded for not meeting the task requirement. 
2 Due to violation of the assumptions of homogeneity of variance and normal 
distribution, non-parametric tests such as the Mann-Whitney U test were used.  
3 Weight coefficients were for: a) number of body parts fully removed: 5 points for the 
head, 1 point for whole arm/s and whole leg/s, 0.5 points for part of arm/leg and all remaining 
body parts (i.e. ear/s, nose, eye/s); b) size of cuts through the body/body parts: 1 point for the 
head and main body, 0.2 points for arms and legs; c) amount of inner material removed: 1 
point. 
4 When controlling for materialism (success, centrality) in the mediation model, mental 
state attribution still partially mediated the effect of money on destructive behavior. The 
mediation remained significant, CI = -.35 to -.0048, 95% confidence interval, 5000 re-
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
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Table 1. Correlations Among the Measures used in Study 1 
Variable M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
1. Objectification 
 
3.15 (0.73) 
             
2. Money 
(obsession) 
2.43 (0.98) .489**             
3. Money (power) 3.83 (1.15) .313** .596**            
4. Money (budget) 4.14. (1.22) .114 .128 .086           
5. Money 
(achievement) 
3.15 (1.25) .273** .516** .583** .111          
6. Money 
(evaluation) 
3.74 (1.27) .106 .285** .377** .010 .088         
7. Money (anxiety) 3.16 (1.24) .188* .395** .417** .176 .264** .570**        
8. Money 
(retention) 
4.16 (1.24) .083 -.018 .126 .245** .115 .330** .295**       
9. Money (non-
generosity) 
4.52 (1.25) .096 .313** .322** .147 .321** .079 .152 .090      
10. Money (power-
prestige) 
2.42 (0.88) .490** .724** .631** .015 .575** .342** .490** .115 .246**     
11. Education 7.20 (2.14) -.110 .091 .157 -.062 .079 -.175 -.020 -.297** .029 .021    
12. Social Status 5.03 (1.67) .033 .034 .006 .038 .074 - .207* -.170 -.081 .046 .032 .289**   
13. Income 6.36 (4.13) -.089 .104 .123 - .035 .050 - .038 -.164 -.107 .187* .067 .129 .313**  
14. Sense of power 4.17 (0.81) .017 .047 .064 .237** .038 - .021 .072 -.128 .064 .010 .089 .230* .011 
*p < .05    **p < .01 
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Figure 1. (A) Example of a facial target with 9 variants from artificial to human (right side) as used in Study 3. (B) Participants’ level of mental 
state attribution at each point along the face morph continuum including error bars (SEM) and the fitted curves (solid lines) per measure. 
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Figure 2. Amount of destructive behavior shown by a participant in the control condition (a) and money condition (b) in Study 4. 
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Figure 3. Mediation model for the effect of condition (money vs. control) on destructive behavior (total damage incurred) via mental state 
attribution, Study 4. Values for the indirect path (i.e. when controlling for the mediator) are shown in parenthesis. 
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